White Human Shields and Anti-Black Knowledge
Vusumzi NkomoStudents from the University of Cape Town stand facing members of the South African Police Services after they forced their way into the South African Parliament in Cape Town on October 21, 2015.
“[E]very truth has the structure of fiction.” — Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
“[T]he myth of a reconciled and transparent society is simply that: a myth.” —Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time
In March 2015, a Black South African student activist staged an intervention at the University of Cape Town’s Upper Campus by defacing a statue of late British colonialist Cecil John Rhodes and launched a far-reaching student movement. The defacement with excrement, carried out by activist Chumani Maxwele, sparked waves of protests and collective organizing across university and technical and vocational college campuses across the country. These students, often referred to as “Fallists,” would formally organize themselves initially under the banner of #RhodesMustFall and, subsequently, #FeesMustFall.[1]
If #RhodesMustFall grew out of Black students’ frustrations with the forms of knowledge produced by post-apartheid institutions, #FeesMustFall emerged as an immediate response to the government’s proposed fee increments and a general systematic underfunding of institutions of higher learning. The problems raised by these students, though not necessarily new or particular to post-apartheid South Africa (POSTASA), presented yet another missed opportunity for the country to confront its singular narratives of origin and social and structural antagonisms.
During the early days of the #MustFall movement, a social phenomenon that came to be known as the “human shield” became a common feature in protests, particularly during heightened moments of tension between Black students and members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Whenever Black people across the country confront the state and its organs, the police always take upon themselves the duty of exercising excessive force: The student protests were no exception. During these protests inside institutions of higher learning, empathetic white students often joined in, marching in solidarity with Black students. On such occasions, white students started forming layers or blocks of protection between Black students and the police.
These encounters made it to social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, with the public in awe of the affective charge of this spectacle. The public, which had come to know the juggernaut of police violence against Black people as indiscriminate and absolute, with no rhyme or reason, was unprepared to deal with the ethical dilemma of white students’ bodies’ capacity to bring this violence to a sudden halt, whether momentarily or not. The “[white] human shield” was symptomatic of a structure of violence that distributes its deadly force in accordance with a certain hierarchical organization of bodies and their paradigmatic positions in the social field. This violence, here police/state violence, is not some objective force that is only triggered by transgression and then goes into remission; it is a brutal and relentless machine that, over centuries of racial terror, has learned to pick its prey and tell it apart from/against whom it is meant to protect through a cruel differential racial calculus.
What allows this triadic social structure to cohere, and what bonds these agents together? How did they (Black students, white students, and the police) know each other’s functions and places in the world? What do these agents know to be true about each other? In asking or allowing white students to (per)form the human shield, what did Black students know about their white counterparts and their relation to violence and understand about their own precarious structural relation to generalized and gratuitous (police) force? What did the predominantly Black police force know about themselves in relation to the white students in front of them? What did these white students know about the corporeal integrity and relative invulnerability of their bodies that allowed them to self-avail as shields and protective sacrifice for Black students? Crucially, where does this knowledge come from and how is/was it produced and disseminated? It is my contention that this knowledge is anti-black knowledge, and it is fundamentally constitutive of “South Africanness” as a condition.
In short, what I am after is an analysis of the kind of knowledge that is anti-black knowledge: What kind of knowing is knowing anti-blackness and what are the stakes of this knowing? This knowledge is no doubt historically produced, and its implications have come to constitute what South Africans know to be true about themselves and how they come to know themselves, which is always to know what and who they are and what and who they are not. The boundaries of this knowledge—who gets to exist and enjoy its spoils—are closely policed, and the truth of South Africanness masks a fundamental lie. The social fabric of the country comprises a parasitic psychic bond whose contours and limits are as fictive as its impossibilities and incoherences, grounded in an unethical production of its own myths and processes of disavowal of its structuring antagonisms.
How did processes of subject formation in South Africa produce and/or anticipate the dynamics of the encounters mentioned above? How did the Black subject (whether student, academic, administrator, or worker), the white subject, and the agent of the state come to be?[2] The country is founded on and maintained by the logic of the equality of all its subjects, irrespective of race, gender, class, or creed. The ruse of reconciliation is mobilized to neutralize any friction in the functioning of this logic. Rather than a testament to the strength of an interracial bond, the human shield exposes the cracks and limits of this logic through the clarifying metric of each subject’s degrees of exposure to harm.
Reading the human shield retrospectively, a decade after the student movement, I want to consider the continuities between this phenomenon and what South Africans have recently expressed as “No DNA, Just RSA,” a brand of South African neoliberal nationalism and exceptionalism that considers collective identification to be beyond racial categories. The delusory nature of this national mantra is observable in its insistence that the “spirit” of South Africanness lies in the capacity of its subjects to look past the particularities of their coming to be as subjects.
“South Africanness becomes more than just a mere racial-cultural category, something more sinister: a supra-racial designation of exclusionary purity.”
“No DNA, Just RSA” emerged as a catchphrase in moments of mass euphoria following major international sporting and entertainment triumphs. It deliberately and conveniently eschews the fact that in South Africa, only whiteness enjoys uncontested South Africanness; for the rest, it’s contingent on this or that factor and, crucially, anti-blackness marks and regulates the boundaries and limits of national identity.[3] It is a bioessentialist, feel-goodist nationalism that lays claim to “blood” that supposedly knows no race or any other form of differentiation; we are told, chillingly, that pure South Africanness runs through our veins. If you look closely enough, you can tell who doesn’t possess this blood, therefore allowing those who do to ward off the threat of contamination. As is the case with all categories and processes of racial purity that require biomythology, the blood can’t run all over the place without any regulatory mechanism and strict protocol. South Africanness becomes more than just a mere racial-cultural category, something more sinister: a supra-racial designation of exclusionary purity.
The Social Life of Antagonisms
“[A]ntagonism is the limit of all objectivity” —Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time
“What stimulates our desire for new identification acts?” —Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan & the Political
In the early 1990s, during South Africa’s transition from the National Party’s (NP) apartheid regime to an African National Congress-led (ANC) multi-party democratic dispensation, the “sunset clauses”4 functioned as a set of key compromises by Black South Africans to ensure political stability and the wholesale protection of white property and livelihood.5 This is the standard version of South African historiography, which conveniently sidesteps the manner in which any violence from which whiteness would be rendered immune would be directed inward—that is, toward Black people.
The political violence that ensued between the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which led to the deaths of hundreds of Black South Africans across major townships, was aggressively funded by the NP. This alleged state-sponsored violence sought to prove the old colonial myth that “Black South Africans” are unfit to govern themselves without descending into chaos and self-destruction; after all, it seemed, to be a nigger is to be a danger to yourself and prone to acting against your best interests, particularly in the absence of white stewardship and protection. What is a “Black country” if not a hell on Earth that goes by many names, such as Zimbabwe or Haiti? In post-apartheid South Africa, Zimbabwe is so important a myth and threshold that if it did not exist, my country would have to invent it for its own ideological consistency. Zimbabwe is both a scarecrow and a limit point in symbolic-political and geographical terms. It is common to hear locals, political commentators, and politicians remark that the worst thing that could ever happen to South Africa would be to turn into a Zimbabwe; a serious country worth living in must be anything but that.[6] For South Africa to function, it must be sensible enough to avoid attempting to radically reform white property relations and descending into authoritarianism. Fundamentally, the figure of the Zimbabwean—and here we can also include the Nigerian, the Congolese, the Somali—threatens to collapse the bond of post-1994 nirvana and all the promises and “values” that only a South African has the inherent right to enjoy.
However, the civil war, nullified by the sunset clauses, would be funded by the NP in the Black community. If the new South Africa had any chance of being a stable social form, blood would need to be spilled—but far away from civil society proper. And indeed, blood did spill all over major townships; South Africa was indeed stabilized and could only thus cohere as such.[7]
What does it mean, then, for a society, this country, to require as a condition of its possibility anti-black violence and wholesale state-funded mass slaughter of Black flesh? What exactly does this slaughter truly achieve at both intersubjective and socio-political levels, that is, psychic and structural levels? What kind of discursive formation is necessary for the construction and maintenance of a certain South Africanness as a constitutively exclusionary social field? Through a set of rhetorical maneuvers, South Africanness is constructed by way of a disavowal of its own impossibilities, limits, and structuring antagonisms.
According to Ernesto Laclau’s New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time, each society produces its own stabilizing and coherent images that bring together disparate forces and energies. This enables the construction of a “certain horizon, however blurred and imprecise, which somehow unifies its whole experience.” We form a stable idea of where we come from and where we are going as a solid unit in spite of all our differences and contradictions. The idea is not to shed these contradictions/conflicts/differences: They make us who we are. However, structural antagonisms break in on this shared fantasy, introducing breaks, glitches, and slippages that threaten its coherence. Our desire for wholeness (which we once possessed but have now lost) and, by extension, our society as a stable social form, is undermined. The truth of any social field can be located in the history of its originary narratives and retrospective self-understanding—that is, the self-generated myths of its own possibility. The territorial, material, and geopolitical integrity of the social coheres only to the extent to which it represses the knowledge of its limits and obfuscates the often or necessarily violent processes by which these limits and boundaries come to be and how they are policed.
Post-apartheid South Africa is a fantasy in pursuit of an object. We can describe this object as a Black-white racial bond which has no historical basis but must be enjoyed nonetheless, an enjoyment buttressed by fiction and mythmaking. The historical antagonisms that structure and sustain South Africa and the long array of violent encounters between white settlers (which all white South Africans are) and Indigenous communities, such as racial slavery, genocides, colonial conquest, and settlement, point to an unbridgeable gap between South Africans. The bond has never been a reality, and all the horrors of Black South African life are symptomatic of the bond as fiction and ruse. But if South Africanness is to be understood as a fantasy, it is crucial to appreciate how this fantasy has material bearings for social reality and the structures within which that reality is lived. All fantasy functions to sustain desire, and desire is structurally impossible to satisfy, so the pursuit for its fulfillment must be perpetually deferred by the subject. This is as true for the psychosexual dimensions of the subject as it is for the realm of politics and hegemony.
“Post-apartheid South Africa is a fantasy in pursuit of an object.”
Our political desires return to and/or resuscitate lost objects and the lost sense of wholeness they represent, which is nothing but a retrospective reconstitution of something we never really had to begin with. No full sense of identity, subjective or intersubjective, personal or communal, is possible without these retrospective leaps to reconstruct an encounter with a lost sense of coherent and stable origins. There is no eMbo to return to.[8] This retroactive activity seems to secure for the subject a place within a community of subjects who share in and bond over this fantasy (which sustains its desire without ever satisfying it) without abolishing the limit.
In “Revisiting the Master-Signifier, or Mandela and Repression,” Derek Hook and Stijn Vanheule consider the function of late South African president Nelson Mandela as a master-signifier that binds together and secures the coherence and legitimacy of the fantasy of post-apartheid South Africa. Mandela as master-signifier halts the disruptive and unproductive emergence of “a whole series of repressed and negated undercurrents.” The Mandela/Madiba Magic, like other master-signifiers—Rainbowism/Rainbow Nation, the memetic of reconciliation and its recent offspring “No DNA, Just RSA”—reconciles the multitude of antagonisms that, left alone, would erupt and collapse South Africanness from within.
The Whiteness of the Human Shield
In his October 2015 editorial in the South African newspaper The Mail & Guardian, student activist Timothy Wolff-Piggott begins by recounting a dramatic encounter between University of Cape Town and University of the Western Cape students and the police in front of the South African Parliament in Cape Town. This protest had been organized under the banner of #FeesMustFall and, as is the case in every police state, the students, predominantly Black and “acutely aware of perceptions of violence in protest,” expected excessive force from the police. Wolff-Piggott tells us that violence and chaos soon ensued. Student activist Chumani Maxwele was targeted by the police; stun grenades were fired; and a “comrade” was seen lying on the ground injured. It was at this point that Wolff-Piggott moved from being a passive observer into an active agent: “We held ground around her and in the face of violent antagonism, sat down,” he writes.[9]
What follows Wolff-Piggott’s platitude about his whiteness is a stunning admission. Despite the wanton violence of the police against Black student protestors, the writer informs us in a tragically confessional tone that he “was barely aware of how differently [his] presence in that space was perceived” by the police (and Black students?), who let him move with a great degree of ease. White students, Wolff-Piggott among them, formed a “human shield” to protect Black students. However, remarkably, Wolff-Piggott further admits that he “could break from the body of students and move among the officers unimpeded, in stark contrast to the black students around [him].” At this point, the author acknowledges that offering his body up as a protective layer came from, first, a particular place informed by “a clear knowledge” of his paradigmatic position in the South African social field, and, second, a desire to heed the call and “clear mandate of the black students with whom I stood.” It is an attestation riddled with contradictions.
My interest is in attending to questions of violability and immunization in relation to the concept (and event) of the human shield, which is to say, a shield that is always already a non-Black—specifically, white—shield. To put it otherwise, to be structurally vulnerable to the point that you must be shielded marks the gap between life and (social) death: Blackness is intuited as death-in-the-making and whiteness always performs (itself) as (human) life. Paradoxically, the white/human shield expresses the need for the destructive and deadly violence in order to reanimate the phantasmatic bond; whiteness comes alive on the grounds of Black death. Racial superiority tout court; total nonsusceptibility to the cruelty of social death.
In the images that circulated during numerous #FeesMustFall protests, we see white students standing upright with their arms crossed and raised above their heads, forming an X shape, or, at times, as if handcuffed (or handing themselves over to authorities). The images show both white men and women, though, critically, Wolff-Piggott reports that “Black student activists called particularly for white women to move to the front of the crowd; white men insisted on stepping forward—a move that could stand as uninterrogated patriarchy” (emphases mine). The gestures were intended to signal to the police that they, as white students, were not going to pose any physical threat and only sought to protect their vulnerable counterparts.
“Paradoxically, the white/human shield expresses the need for the destructive and deadly violence in order to reanimate the phantasmatic bond; whiteness comes alive on the grounds of Black death.”
Black students’ request that white women form the first layer of the shield demonstrated an attunement to the fact that white women, not least in South Africa, are the quintessentially innocent and vulnerable subjects; the political, material, social and libidinal costs of harming white women are far greater than the costs of any conceivable harm or injury to anyone else. The images show a level of calm in these white students’ faces; they seem at ease and unalarmed by the situation, often staring blankly with a great deal of focus and poise. In one of the few videos of the human shield that can still be found online, which was posted with the text “white allies are asked to move to the front and make a human shield,” an unidentified person holds a megaphone and requests white students move to the front. Their request is followed by a resounding “yeah/yes” from a predominantly Black crowd, along with loud cheers, clapping, finger-snapping, and hands signaling white students move swiftly to the front. This affective and emotionally charged response exposes Black students’ deeply-felt knowledge that they cannot protect themselves and their awareness of their singular precarity. It is this asymmetry that is the truth of South Africanness: These stark particularities and uneven proximities to life and death are the true DNA of the country.
The sovereignty of the white body (sovereign because of its inoculation against gratuitous state violence), Frank Wilderson notes, is secured through the “violence [that] precedes and exceeds Blacks.”
Whiteness fails to see that its immunity from statecraft’s deathmaking violence is descended from its historical impunity; Blackness misrecognizes this immunity as whiteness’ selfless love, even if momentary. White South Africans have never had to pay the price for their historical crimes; in fact, to be white is to be shielded from such accountability. Here, whiteness monopolizes empathy, and its immunity makes possible its perpetual self-reinvention, its possession of the ontological malleability to be both the oppressor and the benevolent ally to which Blackness owes admiration and gratitude.[10] Oh, what a gift, to be loved by Massa. As David Marriott puts it, “In the colony, the ur-fantasy of being the object of white love crystallizes a certain phantasmal relation to blackness misrecognized as such.” Hence, as the tweets suggested, this collective white sacrifice sent Black South Africans into uncontrollable tears. The spectacle of this sacrifice was overwhelming; to see whiteness finally put to some good use, which is nothing but a(n obviously unfulfilled) desire for whiteness to die a Black death.
What are the political consequences of a negrophilia misrecognized as solidarity? What does this say about solidarity—or this solidarity that feeds on this misrecognition? What is the affective charm, or chimera—that is to say, the political purchase and power of white corporeal integrity? How did it secure its powers to shield Blackness and enjoy itself while at it? Similar to white South African content creators’ recent flaunting of their material privileges to disprove the Trump-Musk theory of a white genocide in South Africa, whiteness trades in these moments of extreme visibility as defense of troublesome Black life. This trope is as old as South Africa as a polity and as old as white-Black coalition politics. The price and gains of white political sacrifice (for Black political life) are much higher.[11] The very future of South Africa seems to hinge on Black South Africa misrecognizing these white flourishes as love-solidarity rather than seeing this capaciousness as the unethical extension of whiteness’ symbolic life. The former sustains South Africanness as we know it; the latter precipitates a crisis for political life and imagination more generally.
[1] As the movement matured, its concerns broadened, with outgrowths such as #EndOutsourcing, an extension of the #MustFall movement that addressed the neoliberal outsourcing of essential services on South African campuses.
[2] By “worker,” I am referring to the predominantly Black precarious outsourced labor in the university, such as cleaners, security guards, garden workers, etc. , who became a key part of the student movement as it evolved under the campaign #EndOutsourcing.
[3] Take for instance, the phenomenon of the “elbow in isiZulu” that allows for the policing of Black South Africanness. For an analysis of how this problem plays out in South African media and public discourse and the social and political costs for Tsonga and Venda people, see Cairo Mathebula, “The torment of being a ‘questionable’ South African,” The Mail & Guardian, September 13, 2019.
[4] The reformist “sunset clauses” were concessions made in 1992 by the tripartite alliance of the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to ensure power sharing between the ANC and the National Party (NP). One such concession was that NP officials and apartheid civil servants would be allowed to keep their posts in the new democratic Government of National Unity (GNU).
[5] eMbo is commonly understood to refer to a mythical source or ancestral homeland that marks an origin story for various groups of Black people in South Africa. The phrase “masibuyel’ eMbo” means “let us return to eMbo,” evoking a lost place of sacred precolonial values, traditions and pure customs, uncontaminated by the colonial encounter.
[6] I think these are the spoils of white abolitionism that are not particular to South Africa.
[7] As white anti-apartheid activist and SACP General Secretary Joe Slovo’s grave at Avalon Cemetery in Soweto reads, “In this area lie Joe Slovo & others who gave their lives during the liberation struggle” (emphasis mine). Grateful to Athi Mongezeleli Joja and Andile Mngxitama for bringing this to my attention recently. The grave can be seen here: zu.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Joe_Slovo_Grave, _Avalon_Cemetery,_Soweto.jpg
[8] Considering the NP pursued a narrow ethnonational homeland policy that barred Black people from becoming South African and pushed them to separate quasi-independent states (ethnically delineated “Bantustans”) which no other country outside of apartheid South Africa ever recognized as legitimate states, one could argue that, technically, Black people only became South African in the early 1990s following the dissolution of Bantustans and the formal “absorption” of those territories into South Africa proper.
[9] The most recent remarks of this kind were by the ANC’s Secretary-General Fikile Mbalula, one of the most popular and powerful leaders in the party. In a 2025 interview with Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, he had this to say about land distribution in South Africa: “If you want to see white people running in their numbers out of this country to United States, redistribute the land and then this country will turn into rubble like Zimbabwe . . . they are going to run, they are going to take their money and go; there’s gonna be capital flight and everything.”
[10] The bloody conflict between the ANC and Prince Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi’s Zulu ethnonationalist IFP predates the sunset clauses. The conflict emerged directly and in the aftermath of the mid-1980s’ state of emergency and spilled over into the early 1990s. Contrary to the perception that South Africa’s transition was a bloodless miracle spearheaded by the reconciliatory Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, hundreds of Black people were murdered during these years. It is now understood that the last apartheid president, F. W. de Klerk, supported and armed militant members of the IFP, allegations that the late Buthelezi denied until his death in 2023.
[11] The racial composition of this “we” is unclear, at least at this point in the editorial.